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“‘If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.’ Unless 
you’re losing your children, or your home, or your healthcare . . . .” 
– National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a 
peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the 
Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as 
inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal 
level of free inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as 
divested of two fifths of the MAN.2 
 James Madison wrote The Federalist No. 54 defending the 
infamous three-fifths compromise, which allowed White southern 
slaveowners to aggregate political power on the backs of their Black slaves, 
without representing their interests in any substantive way.3 
Prison gerrymandering—using prison populations as part of the 
underlying population for redistricting—is a modern manifestation of the 
same concept. Prisons, and the people who are currently incarcerated 
within, are uniquely productive in many aspects of society.4 Prisoners may 
                                                           
ǂ Adam Johnson, J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School; M.P.A. 2016, 
La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin. The author would 
especially like to thank the staff members and editorial team of the Mitchell Hamline Law 
Review for taking on the Herculean task of getting this manuscript into shape. Additionally, 
he would like to thank Tyler Junger for his thoughtful critiques, suggestions, and 
encouragement to keep digging. 
1 NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS., http://civilrighttocounsel.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/RR2B-FADJ]. 
2 THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 (James Madison) (The Avalon Project, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed54.asp [https://perma.cc/5VDM-M5U5]). 
While there is some debate over whether this was written by Hamilton or Madison, most say 
Madison is the author. Joerg Knipprath, Federalist No. 54 – The Apportionment of 
Members Among the States, From the New York Packet (Madison or Hamilton), 




3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 (James Madison) (The Avalon Project, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed54.asp [https://per cma.cc/5VDM-M5U5]). 
4 See, e.g., Michael Skocpol, The Emerging Constitutional Law of Prison Gerrymandering, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 1473 (2017) (discussing prison gerrymandering broadly); Faith 
Stachulski, Prison Gerrymandering: Locking Up Elections and Diluting Representational 
Equality, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 401, 407 (2019) (examining court decisions related to prison 
gerrymandering). 
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be paid a lower wage than a similarly employed individual outside of prison.5 
They are almost never allowed to vote.6 Federally, slavery itself is not 
prohibited for incarcerated individuals.7 Prison gerrymandering similarly co-
opts prisoners as a resource to be used for another party’s benefit.8  
This concept is particularly harmful to minority populations when 
amplified by a dramatic rise in incarceration rates generally, exemplified in 
both racial disparities in incarceration rates and racial segregation.9 Due to 
a confluence of extreme racial disparities in incarceration rates and a well-
earned reputation of racial segregation, Wisconsin provides a dramatic 
example of this problem.10  
Wisconsin, like many states, has historically counted prisoners for 
redistricting purposes at their location of incarceration instead of the 
community that they originated in. This practice continues to be justified 
based on an incorrect interpretation of the state’s constitution, which likely 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. To avoid 
perpetuating this flawed method, the state should change how it interprets 
“inhabitants” for the purpose of redistricting before the 2021 redistricting 
cycle. Following the Supreme Court’s rejection of federal court review for 
political gerrymandering issues,11 prison gerrymandering will be a heavily 
litigated area of law at the state level, particularly in states like Wisconsin, 
where the impact is drastic. 
                                                           
5 Wendy Sawyer, How Much Do Incarcerated People Earn in Each State?, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE: PUBL’NS (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/ 
[https://perma.cc/7YTF-PWU3]. 
6 Only Maine and Vermont permit some convicted felons to vote from prison. ME. STAT. 
tit. 21-A, § 112(14) (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2122(a) (2016); Vermont residents 
imprisoned outside of the state may vote absentee. Jane Timm, Most States Disenfranchise 
Felons. Maine and Vermont Allow Inmates to Vote from Prison., NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 
2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/states-rethink-prisoner-voting-rights-
incarceration-rates-rise-n850406 [https://perma.cc/SR3B-R9LV]. 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
8 The Problem, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, 
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/impact.html [https://perma.cc/LT4W-5CL2] 
(“Because prisons are disproportionately built in rural areas but most incarcerated people 
call urban areas home, counting prisoners in the wrong place results in a systematic transfer 
of population and political clout from urban to rural areas.”). 
9 See Michael Skocpol, The Emerging Constitutional Law of Prison Gerrymandering, 69 
STAN. L. REV. 1473, 1486 (2017); Brianna Remster & Rory Kramer, Shifting Power: The 
Impact of Incarceration on Political Representation, 15 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RSCH. ON 
RACE 417, 418 (2018) (“Until the 1980s there were so few prisoners that this policy likely 
had little impact.”). 
10 Wisconsin, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, 
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/wisconsin.html [https://perma.cc/QJQ8-NFGS]. 
11 See generally Whitford v. Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
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This Note has six parts. Part II describes the concept of prison 
gerrymandering. Part III distinguishes incarcerated individuals from other 
analogous populations. Part IV describes prison gerrymandering in 
Wisconsin, specifically. Part V explains how Wisconsin’s interpretation of 
“inhabitants” is inconsistent and erroneous. Part VI suggests that litigation 
based on the Equal Protection Clause might be the best avenue to sue a 
state based on prison-oriented gerrymandering. Finally, Part VII suggests 
two options for Wisconsin to resolve this issue for the 2021 redistricting 
plan: legislative action to prohibit prison gerrymandering or executive action 
by the governor to veto any redistricting plans that uses prison populations 
to inflate districts. 
II. THE CENSUS, STATE REDISTRICTING PRACTICES & HISTORY 
OF PRISON GERRYMANDERING 
 Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution requires an 
“actual enumeration” of persons within the several states to be conducted 
every ten years in a manner specified by Congress.12 Congress has specified 
several mechanisms to perform the “actual enumeration” since 1790.13 
Currently, the process is known as the U.S. Census (Census) and is 
administered by the U.S. Census Bureau (Census Bureau), which conducts 
a decennial enumeration as required by the Constitution along with 
supplemental surveys to gather more detailed statistical information during 
the interim periods.14 This part has five sections. The first will briefly 
examine state redistricting processes generally. The second covers 
Wisconsin’s redistricting process specifically. The third section highlights 
how the federal courts examine districts with unequal population 
distributions. The fourth section provides an overview of prison 
gerrymandering generally, and the final section briefly reviews the current 
federal precedent for prison gerrymandering cases. 
A. State Redistricting Processes 
States are given great discretion in determining how to reapportion 
their legislative and congressional districts.15 Generally, “[u]nless a choice is 
one the Constitution forbids, the resulting apportionment base offends no 
                                                           
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 




15 See generally Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016). 
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constitutional bar . . . .”16 In the 1960s, the Supreme Court established in 
Baker v. Carr that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires legislative districts to be roughly equal in population.17 
Subsequently, the Court in Reynolds v. Sims required states to equalize 
population in legislative districts “as nearly as is practicable.”18 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Reynolds established the principle of “one person, one 
vote” to guide states in determining valid redistricting schemes.19  
Every state uses the national Census in some capacity for their 
redistricting process, although “[s]tates are [not] required to include aliens, 
transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for 
conviction of crime in the apportionment base by which their legislators are 
distributed.”20 Seven states (Washington, California, Nevada, Maryland, 
Delaware, New York, and New Jersey) have prohibited the practice of using 
prison populations when redistricting.21 Several others, including 
Tennessee, Colorado, Michigan, Virginia, and Massachusetts, have enacted 
some measure of limiting the impact of prison populations on redistricting.22 
In Wisconsin, lack of political will stifled the efforts to prohibit this practice 
within the legislature during the 2009 and 2011 sessions.23  
Outside of the few states that recently adopted changes related to 
counting prisoners in upcoming redistricting cycles, states have largely 
remained stagnant on the issue. 24 “Legislative inaction, coupled with the 
unavailability of any political or judicial remedy, had resulted, with the 
passage of years, in the perpetuated scheme becoming little more than an 
irrational anachronism.”25  
                                                           
16 Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966). A full discussion of the Court’s evolving 
jurisprudence on redistricting generally is outside the scope of this Note. For a more 
thorough discussion, see Thomas L. Brunell, The One Person, One Vote Standard in 
Redistricting: The Uses and Abuses of Population Deviations in Legislative Redistricting, 
62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1057 (2012). 
17 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962). 
18 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). 
19 Id. at 570. 
20 Burns, 384 U.S. at 92. 
21 See Ludwig Hurtado, States Move to Outlaw ‘Prison Gerrymandering’: Where Do Inmates 
Really Live?, NBC NEWS (May 23, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-
news/will-prison-gerrymandering-be-next-big-fight-n999656 [https://perma.cc/P66E-CK5K]; 
Brent Johnson, N.J. Will Soon Allow You to Register to Vote Online, NJ.COM (Jan. 21, 
2020), https://www.nj.com/politics/2020/01/nj-will-soon-allow-you-to-register-to-vote-
online.html [https://perma.cc/84L9-7N8B]. 
22 Hurtado, supra note 20; Johnson, supra note 20. 
23 See Assemb. J. Res. 63, 2009–10 Assemb. (Wis. 2009); Assemb. J. Res. 122, 2011–12 
Assemb. (Wis. 2011).  
24 Hurtado, supra note 21 (outlining the changes that seven states, including New York and 
California, will make to their redistricting process following the 2020 census). 
25 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 570 (1964). 
5
Johnson: Wisconsin’s 3/5 Compromise: Prison Gerrymandering in Wisconsin Di
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
484 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
B.  Redistricting in Wisconsin 
Wisconsin’s redistricting process has been consistent in the post-
Reynolds era.26 District lines are reevaluated and adjusted every ten years to 
reflect population changes by balancing principles of equal population, 
compactness, contiguity, shared communities of interest, unity of political 
subdivisions, and minority protection.27 The process is simple: the 
legislature makes the maps, and the governor signs them into law.28 
Wisconsin’s process is entirely political, originating with the elected 
legislature, then culminating with the governor’s approval or veto.29 This 
process is the most common approach to redistricting in the United States.30 
Prior to the 1960s, Wisconsin’s redistricting process created districts with 
dramatic differences in population, despite state constitutional requirements 
for districts to be equally-populated.31 In the years since, consistent with 
guidance from the Supreme Court, Wisconsin’s redistricting efforts have 
largely played out in the court system as political parties sought to challenge 
individual districts.32  
C.  Unequal Redistricting 
Though the courts have generally allowed states discretion in 
determining their redistricting process, there is some recent guidance on 
how those processes may be challenged. In Harris v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission, voters in Arizona challenged the state’s 
redistricting plans following the 2010 redistricting cycle.33 In 2000, Arizona 
                                                           




27 Id. at 1–5. 
28 WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
29 See, e.g., The “Iowa Model” for Redistricting, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 
6, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/the-iowa-model-for-redistricting.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/F6GB-TPLN]. 
30 Justin Levitt, Who Draws the Lines?, LOYOLA L. SCH.: ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php [https://perma.cc/7WVR-NE9U] (providing an overview 
of the different methods of redistricting across the United States). 
31 Keane, supra note 25, at 6. 
32 See, e.g., State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 23 Wis. 2d 606 (1964); Wisconsin AFL-
CIO v. Elections Bd., 543 F. Supp. 2d 630 (1982); Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 
859 (1992); Baumgart v. Wendelberger, No. 01-C-0121, 2002 WL 34127471 (E.D. Wis. 
May 30, 2002). For a thorough discussion of Wisconsin’s contentious history of redistricting, 
see KEANE, WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, REDISTRICTING IN WISCONSIN (2016), 
https://www.wisdc.org/images/files/pdf_imported/redistricting/redistricting_april2016_leg_r
ef_bureau.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7TM-AURF]. 
33 Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1306 (2016). 
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adopted an independent redistricting commission to draw its maps, using 
this same commission in 2010.34 The developed maps, after attempting to 
compensate for Voting Rights Act concerns, created districts with a total 
population deviation of 8.8%.35 That is, the largest districts deviated from 
the average by a maximum of that amount. The Harris Court declined to 
reject Arizona’s maps. Instead, it required that any challenge to a state-
approved plan must show that it is “more probable than not that a 
population deviation [from absolute equality of districts] of less than 10 
percent reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment factors 
rather than the legitimate considerations.”36 This means that if the total 
population difference between districts is less than ten percent, any 
challenge must show that it was predominantly based on illegitimate 
factors.37 While the Court did not enumerate an exhaustive list of illegitimate 
factors, it specified that legitimate factors for redistricting could include 
traditional concerns such as compactness, contiguity, and the integrity of 
political subdivisions.38 As a result, the challenge failed, and Arizona’s maps 
were upheld.39 
D.  Political Gerrymandering 
Gerrymandering is a practice as old as our country itself. In 1789, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote, “[Virginia Governor Patrick] Henry has so 
modelled the districts for representatives as to tack Orange [County] to 
counties where he himself has great influence that [John] Madison may not 
be elected into the lower federal house.”40 Despite some efforts to wrangle 
the gerrymander, the Supreme Court has limited its own role in dictating 
how Congressional representational maps are created to cases involving 
population disparities or race.41 
Most recently, in Rucho v. Common Cause, the Court held that 
political gerrymandering was a nonjusticiable issue for the federal courts so 
                                                           
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1309. 
36 Id. at 1307. The Court also noted that the Voting Rights Act sections that prompted 
Arizona to create districts with 8.8% total population variance were held unconstitutional by 
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1307. The Court 
declined to reject Arizona’s maps on this ground as Arizona developed the maps in 2010, 
prior to the Shelby County decision. Id. at 1308. 
37 Id. at 1307.  
38 Id. at 1306–07. 
39 Id. 
40 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2494 (2019) (quoting 5 Writings of Thomas 
Jefferson 71 (P. Ford ed. 1895) (Letter to W. Short (Feb. 9, 1789)). 
41 See id. at 2495–97 (highlighting actions Congress took throughout the 1800s and 1900s to 
limit the impact of gerrymandering, the efforts by the Court in Baker v. Carr, and the racial 
discrimination line of cases to eliminate these types of gerrymanders). 
7
Johnson: Wisconsin’s 3/5 Compromise: Prison Gerrymandering in Wisconsin Di
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
486 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
long as the jurisdiction did not depart from the traditional “one person, one 
vote” standards and otherwise engage in unlawful discrimination.42 In 
Rucho, a consolidation of separate cases, voters in Maryland and North 
Carolina challenged their states’ redistricting maps as unconstitutional 
gerrymanders based on partisanship.43 The Maryland plaintiffs complained 
that their state maps favored Democrats by an unfair margin, and the North 
Carolina plaintiffs complained that their state maps favored Republicans.44 
Specifically, voters challenged the maps on the basis of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming the maps unfairly diluted 
their votes.45 The Court declined to extend the Equal Protection Clause to 
partisan gerrymandering on the basis that partisan gerrymanders “rest on an 
instinct that groups with a certain level of political support should enjoy a 
commensurate level of political power and influence.”46 The Court 
continued to explain that partisan gerrymandering claims “invariably sound 
in a desire for proportional representation,” which the Equal Protection 
Clause does not require.47 Eventually, all of the partisan gerrymandering 
claims were held to be “beyond the reach of the federal courts.”48 
However, prison gerrymandering is not as neat an issue, particularly 
with disproportionate rates of incarceration. Black individuals make up 
twelve percent of the national population, but thirty-three percent of the 
prison population nationwide is Black.49 Hispanic individuals are sixteen 
percent of the national population and twenty-three percent of the prison 
population.50 This disparity may be sufficient to constitute an impermissible 
racial gerrymander.  
E.  Prison Gerrymandering in the Federal Courts 
The federal courts have considered several cases in recent years; 
however, there is no consensus. 
                                                           
42 See id. at 2501–02. 
43 Id. at 2491. 
44 See id. 
45 Id. Plaintiffs from North Carolina also put forward claims based on the First Amendment, 
the Elections Clause, and violations of Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. 
Maryland plaintiffs primarily put forward First Amendment claims. Id. The Fourteenth 
Amendment argument is most directly relevant to prison gerrymandering. 
46 Id. at 2486. 
47 Id. (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75–76, (1980)). 
48 Id. at 2506–07. 
49 John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison Is 
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1. The Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners 
Decision 
In Calvin v. Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, a rural 
county was determined to have violated the Equal Protection Clause due to 
prison gerrymandering.51 Jefferson County, Florida, is governed by a five-
person Board of Commissioners elected from districts of roughly equal 
population. However, one district included the Jefferson Correctional 
Institute (JCI), which housed over 1,100 incarcerated individuals.52 These 
districts were created by the Board of Commissioners pursuant to Florida 
state law, dividing the territory “into districts of contiguous territory as nearly 
equal in population as practicable.”53 Throughout the redistricting process, 
the Board sought advice on how to accommodate JCI’s large prison 
population. It ultimately decided to try equalizing the total population 
without regard to how many prisoners were in any single district.54 For one 
district, the subsequent maps produced its total population to be roughly 
equal to the others, but it contained nearly thirty percent fewer individuals 
when the JCI population was not included.55 Calvin was brought by voters 
in a district neighboring the one containing the JCI population, claiming that 
including so many prisoners in one district unfairly inflated its residents’ 
voting power, violating the claimants’ rights under the “one person, one 
vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause.56 
To answer this question, the court deconstructed the “one person, 
one vote” concept and how individuals interacted with each other, the 
community, and their representatives.57 It then clarified when states have the 
flexibility in determining which populations ought to be equalized when 
drawing districts.58  
The court ultimately broke down existing Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence into the dueling concepts of representational equality and 
electoral equality.59 While the Calvin Court was unable to state an affirmative 
bright-line rule, it did clarify that existing jurisprudence did not permit 
                                                           
51 Calvin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1295 (N.D. Fla. 2016). 
52 Id. at 1295–96. 
53 Id. at 1296; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (“After each decennial census the board of county 
commissioners shall divide the county into districts of contiguous territory as nearly equal in 
population as practicable.”). 
54 Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1297. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 1298. 
57 Id. at 1303–11. 
58 See id. at 1312–14. 
59 Id. 
9
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redistricting plans that violate both representational and electoral equality.60 
Put succinctly,  
An apportionment base for a given legislative body cannot 
be chosen so that a large number of nonvoters who also 
lack a meaningful representational nexus with that body are 
packed into a small subset of legislative districts. Doing so 
impermissibly dilutes the voting and representational 
strength of denizens in other districts and violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.61 
 Accordingly, the court rejected the district lines, finding them 
unconstitutional, as the “true denizen” population of the district containing 
the prison was two-thirds the population of other districts which is far greater 
than the ten percent threshold identified in Harris.62 
2. The Evenwel v. Abbott Decision  
The Supreme Court again addressed how populations should be 
counted for redistricting purposes in Evenwel v. Abbott.63 During 2010 
redistricting, Texas drew its legislative districts based on a roughly equalized 
total population, without consideration for the equalization of the eligible 
voter population.64 Like Arizona in Harris, Texas was subject to sections of 
the Voting Rights Act requiring federal approval before implementing 
voting changes.65 Texas’s eventual maps were based on equalizing the total 
population of each district, and it achieved that goal with a Harris-approved 
population deviation of an average 8.04%.66 However, when measured by 
eligible voter population, the maximum deviation exceeded forty percent.67 
In Evenwel, the plaintiffs—residents of districts with particularly large eligible 
voter populations relative to the total population—sued the state of Texas 
for creating districts in violation of the Equal Protections Clause.68  
The Court analyzed the constitutional history of how congressional 
districts ought to be apportioned, and determined that the original intent 
was for reapportionment to be based on total population without regard for 
                                                           
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1315 (internal footnote omitted). 
62 Id. at 1323–24. However, the court did caution that the result may have come out 
differently had Calvin concerned a state redistricting plan since the “representational nexus” 
analysis would change. Id. at 1324. 
63 Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016). 
64 Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1306 (2016); Evenwel, 136 
S. Ct. at 1125. 
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voter eligibility, citing the three-fifths compromise as evidence.69 This 
original constitutional position was revisited following the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent debates over voter-based 
apportionment, which ultimately resulted in retaining the total voter basis 
for apportionment.70 The Court declined to read a requirement for equal 
districts based on total voting population instead of total population into the 
Equal Protection Clause.71 
Nonvoters have an important stake in many policy 
debates—children, their parents, even their grandparents, 
for example, have a stake in a strong public-education 
system—and in receiving constituent services . . . . By 
ensuring that each representative is subject to requests and 
suggestions from the same number of constituents, total-
population apportionment promotes equitable and 
effective representation.72 
Subsequently, the Court declined to decide if states may 
permissibly draw districts to equalize eligible voter population instead of 
total population.73 However, it did note that in some rare circumstances, a 
different standard for redistricting may be adopted so long as that standard 
is nondiscriminatory.74 Without explicitly stating what factors might create 
these rare situations, the Court held that “‘[e]qual representation for equal 
numbers of people is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting 
power and diminution of access to elected representatives.’”75 This suggests 
that it is permissible to draw districts based on a measure other than total 
population if the alternative would result in a “debasement” of voting power 
for a community.76 
3. The Davidson v. City of Cranston Decision 
In a more recent decision post-Evenwel, the First Circuit came to 
the opposite conclusion than in Calvin when confronted with a similar 
situation and remarkably similar facts.77 The City of Cranston has six wards, 
one of which was redistricted to include all 3,433 prisoners at the Adult 
                                                           
69 Id. at 1127. 
70 Id. at 1128. 
71 Id. at 1132. 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 1133. 
74 Id. at 1142 (citing Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 75 (1966), wherein Hawaii’s large 
military base population created a situation justifying the exclusion of the members of the 
armed forces from state redistricting) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
75 Id. at 1131 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969)). 
76 See id. 
77 Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135, 138–40 (1st Cir. 2016). 
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Correctional Institutions (ACI).78 Subtracting the prisoners from the ward’s 
population would have created a roughly thirty-five percent population 
deviation from the city’s other wards.79 Four residents of those wards 
complained that this redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause 
by diluting their voting power in comparison with the ward containing ACI.80 
For similar reasons as the Calvin court, the district court upheld the 
plaintiff’s challenge as: 
“[t]he inmates at the ACI share none of the characteristics 
of the [historically nonvoting] constituencies [such as 
women, children, slaves, taxpaying Indians, and non-
landholding men] described by the Supreme Court” . . . to 
deserve representation in apportionment [and that] the 
inmates have no interest in Cranston’s public schools, 
receive few services from the City, and have no contact with 
Cranston’s elected officials.81 
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s decision.82 
Acknowledging that Evenwel did not address the precise question of prison 
gerrymandering, the First Circuit nevertheless upheld the redistricting based 
on equalized total population, noting the process could only be deemed 
discriminatory based on a showing that racial groups have been 
disadvantaged.83 As the court explained, “[t]he more natural reading of 
Evenwel is that the use of total population from the Census for 
apportionment is the constitutional default, but certain deviations are 
permissible, such as the exclusion of non-permanent residents, inmates, or 
non-citizen immigrants.”84  
The Calvin/Davidson split highlights the tension created by the 
unique position of prisoners in a district’s total population. In the coming 
years, the Supreme Court will likely be called upon to decide this unique 
and narrow situation.  
III. DISTINGUISHING INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS FROM OTHER 
NON-VOTING OR TRANSIENT POPULATIONS 
                                                           
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 139. 
81 Id. at 139–40. 
82 Id. at 146.  
83 Id. at 142–43 (“It is true that Evenwel did not decide the precise question before us. 
Nevertheless, we hold that its methodology and logic compel us to hold in favor of Cranston. 
Evenwel dictates that we look at constitutional history, precedent, and settled practice. Doing 
so leads us to find the inclusion of the ACI prisoners in Ward Six constitutionally 
permissible.” (internal citations omitted)).  
84 Id. at 144. 
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 Prison populations share similarities with other populations that 
have a temporary residence or are non-voting, but the circumstances of their 
incarceration warrant different treatment for representation purposes. 
Consistent with Evenwel, moving to redistricting based entirely on the total 
number of voters is undesirable when it results in a “debasement of voting 
power and diminution of access to elected representatives.”85 Mass 
incarceration, working in conjunction with rurally placed prisons, debases 
voting power and reduces access to actual representation for the 
incarcerated individuals and the communities from which they are 
incarcerated.86 This Part distinguishes prisoners from frequently analogized 
populations. 
A.  Usual Residence Rule for Group Quarters  
To count individuals, the Census Act of 1790 established the “usual 
residence” rule, defining residence as the place “where a person lives and 
sleeps most of the time.”87 One of the most substantive challenges facing the 
Census Bureau is determining how to count individuals who are living in 
temporary group quarters, college students, members of the military, or 
incarcerated individuals. In 1950, the Census Bureau explicitly declared that 
college students should be counted at their “usual residence,” which was 
typically their college location.88 Since 1970, the Census Bureau has counted 
service members serving overseas as residents of their home state, while 
counting service members serving at a domestic base as residents of that 
military base.89 Similarly, prisoners have been counted as residents of their 
prison’s location, and the Census Bureau recently announced that this 
practice would continue for the 2020 Census.90  
                                                           
85 Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1131 (2016) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 
526, 531 (1969)). 
86 See Remster & Kramer, supra note 8, at 4 (stating, “[f]or example, were the U.S. to 
prioritize vote equality over representational equality, at least 13 congressional districts would 
move from states with large non-voting immigrant populations such as Texas and California 
to states with relatively low immigrant populations like Kentucky and Montana. . . . 
Hyperincarceration may subtly, but perniciously, violate the constitutional right to equal 
representation for all persons.”). 
87 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/2020-census/about/residence-
rule.html [https://perma.cc/3EBV-H2Z8]. 
88 D’vera Cohn, College Students Count in the Census, but Where?, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 
15, 2010), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/03/15/college-students-count-in-the-
census-but-where/ [https://perma.cc/9WTE-VF3G]. 
89 Richard Sisk, Census to Count Troops by Base Home Address, Officials Say, 
MILITARY.COM (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/08/12/census-
count-troops-base-home-address-officials-say.html [https://perma.cc/EEL7-754T]. 
90 Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. 5525 (Feb. 
8, 2018), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/02/08/2018-
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The Census count has a substantial impact on a community, 
particularly in locations where the atypical “usual residence” situations 
apply. College towns, military bases, and prisons can inflate the resident 
count, which may impact federal funding eligibility, voting power, and 
district shapes during state and local redistricting processes. Former New 
Jersey Governor, Chris Christie, cited prisoner’s consumption of 
community resources and services as a reason for vetoing a bill that would 
have banned prison gerrymandering in 2016.91  
Despite similar treatment by many states, the assumption that the 
three groups are “similarly situated” is “questionable at best.”92 Prisoners are 
distinctly different from college students and members of the armed forces 
in three critical ways: they do not engage with the community in any 
meaningful way; they are unable to politically express themselves or 
manifest their political goals; and there is a lack of meaningful choice on 
behalf of prisoners in determining their location. 
1.  Lack of Community Engagement 
Prisoners are distinct from both college students and members of 
the armed forces in their ability to engage with their local communities. 
Students who are counted at their university address are integral to their 
local communities. Businesses are established to cater to their needs. 
Students and members of the armed forces work in the community, buy 
goods and services in the community, and are otherwise members of the 
community like anyone else.93 Conversely, instead of being capable of 
engaging and integrating with local communities for shared benefit, 
                                                           
02370/final-2020-census-residence-criteria-and-residence-situations [https://perma.cc/546P-
DY8S]. 
91 Hurtado, supra note 21. New Jersey has since banned prison gerrymandering after electing 
a new governor in 2018. Johnson, supra note 21. 
92 Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp. 2d 887, 896 (D. Md. 2011), aff'd, 567 U.S. 930 (2012) 
(stating, “[w]e also observe that the plaintiffs' argument on this point implies that college 
students, soldiers, and prisoners are all similarly situated groups. This assumption, however, 
is questionable at best. College students and members of the military are eligible to vote, 
while incarcerated persons are not. In addition, college students and military personnel have 
the liberty to interact with members of the surrounding community and to engage fully in 
civic life. In this sense, both groups have a much more substantial connection to, and effect 
on, the communities where they reside than do prisoners.”). But see Rucho v. Common 
Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
93 See e.g., Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F.2d 575, 579 (3rd Cir. 1971) (focusing on 
the importance of students ability to “eat, sleep, and work” in a community); Julie A. 
Ebenstein, The Geography of Mass Incarceration: Prison Gerrymandering and the Dilution 
of Prisoners’ Political Representation, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323, 368 (2018) (quoting 
language from Fletcher, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 896). 
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prisoners are purposefully and intentionally kept apart from the 
communities that neighbor the prison.94  
Governor Christie’s argument for retaining prison gerrymandering 
was that prisoners consumed resources that communities receive, in part, 
based on the Census population results, and it would therefore be unfair to 
reduce that funding.95 However, prisoners cannot utilize resources from any 
of the ten largest programs whose funds are guided by Census data.96 While 
the additional money derived from counting prisoners in the location of 
their incarceration benefits that community, it does not benefit the prisoners 
who are artificially inflating that Census count.97 
2.  Lack of Political Power and Expression 
As articulated in Calvin, prisoners lack a “representational nexus” 
to their elected officials.98 In short, representational equity is only met if 
prisoners have some sort of connection to their representatives.99 Unlike 
other transitory communities, most incarcerated individuals cannot vote in 
the communities in which they purportedly reside.100 Combined with a lack 
of visibility and engagement within the prison’s community, there is little 
incentive for elected officials to consider the incarcerated population as 
constituents. In Dodge County, Wisconsin, where three large prison 
populations comprise a large proportion of the total population, an elected 
official said “he doesn’t consider that large demographic when governing. 
The prisoners don’t contact him, and he doesn’t reach out to them.”101 It is 
likely a common perspective among elected officials.102 Indeed, “[w]hen 
                                                           
94 Ebenstein, supra note 92. 
95 See Hurtado, supra note 21. 
96 The top ten programs guided by census data are Medicaid, Federal Direct Student Loans, 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Medicare Supplement Insurance (Part B), 
Highway Planning and Construction, Federal Pell Grant Program, Section 8 Housing Choice 
Vouchers, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Very Low to Moderate Income 
Housing Loans, and Title I Grants to Local Education Agencies. Tracy Gordon, The Census 
Is About Nearly $1 Trillion in Federal Spending, Not Just Elections, TAX POL’Y CTR. (June 
27, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/census-about-nearly-1-trillion-federal-
spending-not-just-elections [https://perma.cc/9FLG-KCA8].  
97 See id. 
98 Calvin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2016). 
99 See id. 
100 Timm, supra note 5. 
101 Tim Damos, In Depth: Feds Won’t Change How Prisoners Counted in 2020, BARABOO 




102 The nationwide “Visit a Prison Challenge” promoted by Families Against Mandatory 
Minimums strongly suggests that it is unusual for elected officials to truly consider prisoners 
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polled, legislators view prisoners from their home districts who are 
incarcerated elsewhere as their constituency more so than prisoners 
incarcerated in their districts who otherwise have no ties there.”103 
Students and members of the armed forces can engage politically 
in other ways as well. They can organize advocacy campaigns that include 
canvassing, phone banking, letter writing, advertising, attending local 
advocacy events, and they can simply knock on their representative’s door 
and ask to be heard. Prisoners do not have opportunities to tie themselves 
to the representation of the community.104 
3.  Lack of Meaningful Choice in Location 
There is precedent for counting populations living in group 
quarters from their prior, permanent location instead of their temporary 
locations. In Franklin v. Massachusetts,105 the court addressed the question 
of how to appropriately count members of the armed forces stationed 
overseas while the Census occurred.  Massachusetts lost a congressional seat 
after the 1990 Census and brought action against the Census Bureau for 
counting overseas soldiers at their “home of record” instead of as residents 
of the overseas location.106 Massachusetts argued that this practice violated 
the “usual residence” rule and was unconstitutional in conducting an “actual 
Enumeration” as required by the United States Constitution.107 The Court 
rejected this argument unanimously.108  
[Usual residence] can mean more than mere physical 
presence, and has been used broadly enough to include 
some element of allegiance or enduring tie to a place . 
. . .The Act placed no limit on the duration of the absence, 
                                                           
or their needs when governing. FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, 
https://famm.org/visitaprison/ [https://perma.cc/AR4P-8E5A]; see also Stephanie Wykstra, 
The Growing Push for Politicians to #VisitAPrison, THE PROGRESSIVE (Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://progressive.org/dispatches/growing-push-for-politicians-visit-prison-wykstra-190829/ 
[https://perma.cc/D24L-QGYN] (“It’s our job. We represent them, too. So whether or not 
they’re enfranchised or disenfranchised, we are still their representative, . . . [t]o not pay any 
attention, to not come and listen to and speak to such a huge portion of our population in 
some of these districts, is egregious and unacceptable.”). 
103 Remster & Kramer, supra note 8, at 421. 
104 Ebenstein, supra note 93, at 369–70 (“Prisons allow for only a limited connection between 
people incarcerated and the residents of the community surrounding the prison and few 
opportunities to politically engage. By contrast, college students and military personnel can 
choose to engage their surrounding communities in civic life.”). 
105 505 U.S. 788 (1992). 
106 Id. at 790–91. 
107 Id. at 795. 
108 Id. at 806. 
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which, considering the modes of transportation available at 
the time, may have been quite lengthy.109 
Relying on the same logic, counting prisoners as residents of their 
communities prior to incarceration “does not hamper the underlying 
constitutional goal of equal representation, but, assuming that employees 
temporarily stationed abroad have indeed retained their ties to their home 
States, actually promotes equality.”110 Both groups lack a meaningful say in 
where they go after leaving their home communities, and likely have 
retained ties to those communities.  
B. Non-Voting Populations 
 A representative democracy includes representation for 
individuals who are not able to cast a ballot for a variety of reasons. While 
it may seem comical to group minors with undocumented immigrants, 
immigrants on a visa, and disenfranchised ex-offenders, all of those 
populations, like incarcerated individuals, are unable to vote for their 
representation. Evenwel made it clear that redistricting based on total 
population without regard for voter population is constitutionally 
permissible.111 However, prisoners can and should be distinguished from 
these other non-voting groups. Prisoners “are a unique non-voting 
population in terms of representation in that they are moved without their 
consent, sequestered from outside interaction, and disconnected from the 
local community and official representatives.”112 
 The Calvin Court considered other groups of non-voters under 
the same “representational nexus” framework that it applied to the 
community at large.113 As is the case for minors who do not wield the ability 
to vote, non-voting individuals may still engage with the political process by 
speaking out on political issues, organizing in their communities, and 
encouraging their representatives to be responsive to their needs. Other 
non-voting communities, such as students here on visas, or non-citizen 
residents, often live, work, eat, and sleep in the same communities as voter-
eligible populations and have functionally the same opportunities to engage 
with and benefit from the communities they live in. Individuals who qualify 
for a path to citizenship under the DREAM Act are a paradigmatic example 
of the opportunities available to engage with the larger community.114 Since 
                                                           
109 Id. at 804. The Court shares an anecdote about President George Washington residing 
primarily at the seat of government or travelling instead of at Mount Vernon, yet he was 
counted as a resident of Mount Vernon in the Census. Id. 
110 Id. at 806. 
111 See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016).   
112 Remster & Kramer, supra note 8, at 12. 
113 Calvin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1310 (N.D. Fla. 2016). 
114 See, e.g., DREAM Act, S. 874, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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President Trump’s termination of the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals program in 2017, the individuals who qualified (“Dreamers”) could 
engage with their political representatives to look after the Dreamers’ 
needs.115 If their needs were not met, Dreamers could even organize mass 
action such as protests and other political activities.116 This type of 
engagement is simply not possible for prisoners.  
Prisoners are distinct from other non-voting and group quarters 
populations and should be treated as such in redistricting efforts. However, 
despite the recent attention given to prison gerrymandering cases in the 
federal court systems,117 and a potential stand-off between conflicting circuit 
law,118 violations of state constitution claims may prove to be the superior 
method of defeating these discriminatory schemes.  
IV. PRISON GERRYMANDERING IN WISCONSIN 
 Wisconsin’s constitution stipulates when redistricting should 
occur. “At its first session after each enumeration made by the authority of 
the United States, the legislature shall apportion and district anew the 
members of the senate and assembly, according to the number of 
inhabitants.”119 Despite the simplicity of the constitutional requirement, the 
Wisconsin  Constitution does not define inhabitants or otherwise clarify the 
mechanisms of redistricting beyond simply charging the legislature to do it.120 
Despite a dearth of textual constitutional guidance to resolve the complex 
issues of who, precisely, is an inhabitant, in 1981, Wisconsin Attorney 
General Bronson La Follette (Attorney General) issued an opinion stating 
that the term “inhabitants,” as used at the time of adoption, was intended to 
be based on all residents regardless of their eligibility to vote.121 Therefore, 
“it would be inappropriate to exclude any institutional population” when 
redistricting the legislature.122 Though the intent of the framers is a powerful 
                                                           
115 See, e.g., Cheyenne Haslett, Dreamers Protest on Capitol Hill on DACA Deadline Day, 
ABC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dreamers-protest-capitol-hill-
daca-deadline-day/story?id=53539262 [https://perma.cc/NU7X-Q5ES].  
116 See id. 
117 See, e.g., Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 2016). 
118 Compare Davidson, 837 F.3d at 144, with Calvin, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 1292, Though Calvin 
was a district court decision, it would serve as precedent if the Eleventh Circuit took up a 
similar case. 
119 WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
120 See id. 
121 See Bronson La Follette, Opinion No. OAG 22-81, 70 Op. Att’y Gen. 80, 88–89 (1981) 
[hereinafter Attorney General 1981 Opinion]. 
122 Id. at 91.  
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argument, the Wisconsin legislature and, subsequently, the Wisconsin 
courts have interpreted and defined inhabitants consistently.123  
Revisiting the opinion is critical for Wisconsin’s democracy. Since 
the Attorney General’s opinion, Wisconsin’s prison population has grown 
from under 4,000 in 1980124 to over 23,000 in 2019,125 and is projected to 
rise to 25,000 by 2021.126 Put another way, Wisconsin incarcerated 84 out 
of every 100,000 residents in 1980 compared to 378 per 100,000 in 2019.127 
This is a sizeable population that is being counted in a different location 
than where they have previously resided and to where they presumably will 
return.  
A. Attorney General’s 1981 Opinion 
The 1981 Attorney General opinion is the only official direct legal 
interpretation of “inhabitant.”128 At the time of its writing, the effect of the 
prison population on districts was likely small.129 The Attorney General’s 
opinion relies on three primary arguments. First, the Census counts 
prisoners at their incarcerated locations due to the usual residence rule. 
Second, the historical usage of “inhabitant” in contemporary statutes 
suggests that prisoners are residents of their prisons. Third, several 
Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions at the turn of the century determined 
the constitutional requirements of redistricting in Wisconsin.130 
                                                           
123 See infra Section II.B. 
124 Prisoners in 1980, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.: BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (May 1981), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p80.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WH3-YD75]. 
125 Corrections at a Glance, WIS. DEP’T OF CORR. (Dec. 2019), 
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/DataAndReports/DAIAtAGlance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SXD9-NTTS]. 
126 See Ximena Conde, Report Shows Record Number of Adults in Wisconsin Prisons, WIS. 
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.wpr.org/report-shows-record-number-adults-
wisconsin-prisons [https://perma.cc/G4SV-CR2Z] (projecting a 5.7% increase in 2021 from 
the amount of adult prisoners in 2017, which was 23,687). 
127 E. Ann Carson, Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool: Imprisonment Rate of Sentenced 
Prisoners Under the Jurisdiction of State or Federal Correctional Authorities per 100,000 
U.S. Residents, December 31, 1978-2018, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Dec. 9, 2019), 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps [https://perma.cc/V7BG-7AF8] (for the year 1980); E. 
ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2019 11–12 tbl. 7 (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p19.pdf [https://perma.cc/T58N-USDJ].  
128 Based on a search of Wisconsin’s Annotated Statutes and Westlaw for Wisconsin state 
courts and federal court cases. See Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 88–
89. Compare State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724 (1892), with State ex rel. 
Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35 (1892) (both discussing the importance of the census in 
the reapportionment process). 
129 See Remster & Kramer, supra note 9, at 9–10 (“Until the 1980s there were so few prisoners 
that this policy likely had little impact.”). 
130 See Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 84, 87, 89.  
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1.  Usual Residence and “Other Aliens” 
 The Attorney General placed great stock in the Census practice 
of counting individuals at their usual residence. Quoting the Census Bureau: 
“These are persons under care or custody at the time of enumeration. They 
are persons in . . . correctional institutions. These persons are enumerated 
as residents of an institution—regardless of their length of stay in a particular 
place.”131 In support, the Attorney General cited Borough of Bethel Park v. 
Stans,132 where the Third Circuit upheld the Census usual residence practice 
for individuals confined to an institution.133  
In Borough of Bethel Park, the city challenged the Census Bureau’s 
practice of counting college students, members of the armed forces, and 
prisoners as inhabitants of their respective institutions, arguing it was 
unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments for the 
purposes of congressional reapportionment.134 The Third Circuit 
proceeded to review how the earliest Congress empowered the Census to 
determine an individual’s location based on their “usual residency.”135 In 
analyzing how college students, members of the armed forces, and prisoners 
have historically been counted, the court rejected the plaintiff’s complaints 
by narrowly focusing on the logistical difficulty faced by the Census Bureau 
in correctly counting and allocating individuals, and that the Constitution 
did not require anything else.136 “The enormous task which the [Census] 
Bureau must complete in enumerating people according to each state can 
reasonably necessitate the use of a definite, accurate and verifiable 
standard.”137 However, the court cites to Burns v. Richardson in a footnote,138 
where the court clarifies that its holding is only true for congressional 
apportionment, while Burns was focused on state legislative redistricting.139 
 The Attorney General also dismissed the distinction between 
non-voting incarcerated individuals and the surrounding community by 
citing Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, which 
held that the U.S. Constitution’s “whole number of persons” requirement 
                                                           
131 Id. at 84 (quoting U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 20th Decennial Census—1980, 
Questionnaire Reference Book (D-561), at 90). 
132 449 F.2d 575, 578 (3rd Cir. 1971).  
133 See Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120 (including other institutions such as 
mental institutions, senior care facilities, and long-term care hospitals). 
134 See Borough of Bethel Park, 449 F.2d at 577. 
135 See id. at 578. 
136 See id. at 581. 
137 Id. at 579.  
138 384 U.S. 73, 92 n.21 (1966).  
139 Borough of Bethel Park, 449 F.2d at 582 n.4 (citing Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 86 
(1966)) (“The Court indicated that a state legislature must be apportioned substantially on a 
population basis but did not say that a particular population measure was required.”).  
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for congressional apportionment includes both “illegal as well as legal 
aliens.”140  
Generally, this analysis tracks with federal jurisprudence, as 
discussed in Evenwel and Harris.141 However, the Attorney General’s 
analysis makes little mention of Burns, decided fourteen years prior, which 
explicitly allowed some form of redistricting based on factors other than 
total population.142 Since Klutznick is a case from the district court of the 
District of Columbia, it is non-binding on Wisconsin. For that reason, these 
deficits in the Attorney General’s opinion could be corrected, if revisited. 
2.  Wisconsin’s Statutory Usage of “Inhabitant” 
 The Wisconsin Constitution was adopted in 1848 and the 
relevant section on reapportionment originally read: 
The legislature shall provide by law for an enumeration of 
the inhabitants of the state in the year one thousand eight 
hundred and fifty-five, and at the end of every ten years 
thereafter, and at their first session after such enumeration, 
and also after each enumeration made by the authority of 
the United States, the legislature shall apportion and 
district anew the members of the senate and assembly, 
according to the number of inhabitants . . . .143 
This is substantially similar to the revised version that exists today.  
At its first session after each enumeration made by the 
authority of the United States, the legislature shall 
apportion and district anew the members of the senate and 
assembly, according to the number of inhabitants.144 
 Statutes passed contemporaneously with the Wisconsin 
Constitution also use the term “inhabitant,” defining it as “a resident in the 
particular locality . . . .”145 This is consistent with other contemporaneous 
laws defining that residents included everyone regardless of whether they 
were able to vote.146 The Attorney General pointed out four sections in the 
                                                           
140 See Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120 (quoting Fed’n for Am. Immigr. 
Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1980)). 
141 See generally supra Section II.E. 
142 See supra text accompanying note 73; Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 
87 n.2. 
143 Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 87 (showing the effective version in 
1981 when the Attorney General wrote the opinion is identical to the modern version with 
“excluding soldiers, and officers of the United States army and navy” appended to the end). 
144 WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
145 Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 88 (citing 1849 Revised Statutes, Ch. 
4, § 1). 
146 See id. at 89 (excluding “certain Indians”). 
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Laws of 1855 that focus on counting residents “within their city, town, or 
division,” or “at every dwelling.”147  
3.  Wisconsin Supreme Court Precedent 
 The Attorney General next argued that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court determined that, due to language specifying reapportionment should 
come after the enumeration in the Census, this decennial Census is 
“evidently intended as the basis of apportionment.”148 This language comes 
from two 1892 Wisconsin Supreme Court cases on reapportionment.149 The 
Attorney General then continued to discuss equal apportionment and its 
interpretation by the state and federal courts.150 However, only the 1892 
cases directly apply to prison gerrymandering.151 
B. Race and Residency 
Where prisoners are counted for representation is more relevant 
in Wisconsin due to the overwhelming concentration of minorities in 
Milwaukee—Wisconsin’s largest city.152 Wisconsin also disproportionately 
incarcerates Black residents, at a rate of 11.5 times more than white 
residents.153 Though the state as a whole is largely White, rural communities 
are experiencing population decline, while the urban counties where Black 
residents predominantly live are growing.154 Counting incarcerated 
individuals in the county of incarceration, instead of county of residence, 
inflates the residency numbers in shrinking rural counties with large prisons, 
                                                           
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 90 (quoting State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35 (Wis. 1892)). 
149 See State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. at 35; State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. 
Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 738 (Wis. 1892).  
150 Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 91–93. 
151 See id. 
152 Katherine J. Curtis & Sarah E. Lessem, 2010 Census Chartbook, WIS. APPLIED 
POPULATION LAB 30 (Dec. 2014), 
https://cdn.apl.wisc.edu/publications/2010_census_chartbook_wi.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/36ZW-JYNG] (“Today, Wisconsin’s African Americans live primarily in 
the southeast and in rural counties that have prisons.”). 
153 See, e.g., Mary M. Prosser & Shannon Toole, Wisconsin’s Mass & Disparate 
Incarceration, 91 WIS. LAW. (Apr. 2018), 
https://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=91&I
ssue=4&ArticleID=26275 [https://perma.cc/E7PC-SLNC].  
154 See, e.g., Chris Hubbuch, Census: Dane County Leads State in Population Growth; More 
than Double Any Other County in Wisconsin, WIS. ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/census-dane-county-leads-state-in-
population-growth-more-than/article_3ae7268e-8f02-52e3-a599-8787064dcf60.html 
[https://perma.cc/6QCS-UJVX] (reporting and visualizing raw data from the Census 
Bureau). 
22
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 3
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol47/iss2/3
2021] WISCONSIN’S 3/5 COMPROMISE 501 
distorting overall legislative maps. The true populations of Black 
communities in Wisconsin are undercut because the disproportionately 
Black prison population contributes instead to the “population” in primarily 
White districts. 
Though statewide efforts to legislatively change this practice have 
failed, some localities in Wisconsin have responded to their incarcerated 
populations by splitting out the population among several districts to dilute 
the distortional effects. Specifically, pursuant to the Calvin decision, Dodge 
County, Wisconsin, has drawn its supervisor districts to split large 
correctional facilities among six districts so that voters in one district do not 
have disproportionate weight given to their votes.155 This county-level 
solution mirrors solutions pursued elsewhere nationally.156 
V. WISCONSIN’S CONSTITUTION REQUIRES “RESIDENCY” FOR 
REDISTRICTING 
By counting incarcerated individuals at their place of incarceration, 
Wisconsin is likely violating its own constitutional requirements for 
redistricting. The Wisconsin Constitution requires that districts be 
reapportioned “according to the number of inhabitants.”157 The Attorney 
General’s opinion is an incorrect reading based on historic Census practice 
and convenience, without regard to the distorting effects of such a policy 
and the legislative usage of “inhabitants.”158 
As of February 28, 2020, Wisconsin has incarcerated 23,471 
individuals.159 Of these individuals, over 43% are Black,160 despite comprising 
only 6.1% of Wisconsin’s population.161 Wisconsin’s Black population is 
also highly concentrated in six counties in Wisconsin’s southeast.162 
Milwaukee County alone is home to nearly seventy percent of Wisconsin’s 
                                                           
155 See Damos, supra note 101. 
156 See, e.g., Stachulski, supra note 4, at 407. 
157 WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
158 Id. 
159 Weekly Population Report for Friday, Feb. 28, 2020, WIS. DEP’T OF CORR. (2020), 
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/WeeklyPopulationReports/02282020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y5XZ-JFAX]. 
160 2019 Profile of Persons in Our Care, WIS. DEP’T OF CORR. 2 (July 2020), 
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/DataAndReports/2019%20PIOC%20Profile.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JM75-DM2W]. 
161 African Americans in Wisconsin: Overview, WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS. (Sept. 10, 
2018), https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/minority-health/population/afriamer-pop.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JNN7-M63G]. 
162 Id. (“Nearly 90 percent of Wisconsin's African American population lives in the following 
six counties, all of which are located in Southeastern or Southern Wisconsin: Milwaukee, 
Dane, Racine, Kenosha, Rock, and Waukesha.”). 
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Black population.163 Without further statistical information from 
Wisconsin’s Department of Corrections, a precise match of the 
incarcerated population back to their home county is not possible. For 
illustrative purposes only, I assume a proportionate distribution of 
Wisconsin’s Black prison population from each county.164 For example, 
assuming 70 percent of Wisconsin’s Black prison population comes from 
Milwaukee County, that would mean roughly 6,600 Black individuals from 
Milwaukee County are currently being counted externally in other 
counties.165 
A. Legislative Definition 
The Wisconsin Constitution requires that districts are 
reapportioned “according to the number of inhabitants.”166 The Attorney 
General’s opinion on how the constitution interprets “inhabitant” 
contradicts decades of Wisconsin’s statutory interpretation of “inhabitants.” 
The Wisconsin Legislature has weighed in on how to define “inhabitants” 
in other contexts. Wisconsin’s Constitution requires apportionment based 
on all inhabitants.167 Wisconsin law regarding statutory construction defines 
“inhabitant” to mean “resident.”168 Throughout the statutes, residence is 
defined six separate times as the “voluntary concurrence of physical 
presence with intent to remain in a place of fixed habitation . . . .”169 This 
definition predates Attorney General La Follette’s 1981 opinion, but he 
makes no reference to the Legislature’s consistent interpretation in insisting 
upon a different definition of “inhabitant” for this specific clause in the 
constitution.170  
Subsequently, the Wisconsin Legislature has continued to support 
the interpretation that prisoners are not residents—and therefore, not 
inhabitants—of the prisons where they are incarcerated. In Chapter 51 of 
                                                           
163 Id. 
164 This is a rough approximation to help illustrate the argument in the absence of proper 
statistical demographic information. Determining the true extent of prison gerrymandering 
in Wisconsin requires further analysis.  
165 For a more thorough statistical analysis of Pennsylvania, which considers the precise issue 
this Note addresses, see Remster & Kramer, supra note 9. 
166 WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
167 Id. 
168 WIS. STAT. § 990.01(15) (2019) (noting this definition predates Attorney-General La 
Follette’s opinion and the Legislature’s online statutory history does not have a scanned copy 
of its enactment. As noted in the Attorney-General’s opinion, the 1849 Revised Statutes 
define inhabitant as a resident, as well). 
169 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 980.105(1m)(a) (2019); 49.001(6); 46.27(1)(d); 46.272(1)(e); 
55.01(6t); 252.16(1)(e). 
170 The phrase “voluntary concurrence of physical presence with intent to remain” has existed 
in statute since at least 1959. See WIS. STAT. § 49.10(12)(c) (1959). 
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the Wisconsin Statutes, established in 1987, an individual who is in a state 
facility—which includes incarcerated individuals in a state prison as 
established in section 302.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes—is a resident of the 
county in which they were a resident at the time the admission the state 
facility was made.171 Also supporting the interpretation that incarcerated 
individuals are not residents of the prison is section 6.10(1) of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, which states that residency is the place where the 
person’s habitation is fixed and, “when absent, the person intends to 
return.”172 Section 51.40(2)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes directly addresses 
how to determine county of residence for individuals admitted to a state 
prison, and this interpretation is supported by section 6.10(1) of the 
Wisconsin Statutes which provides for temporary absenteeism.  
Wisconsin statutes defining “residence” closely comports with the 
federal definition of domicile as interpreted by federal circuit courts.173 In a 
variety of contexts, federal courts have held an individual does not change 
residence to the prison’s location simply because they are incarcerated 
there.174 As the Sixth Circuit noted, “[t]he rule shields an unwilling sojourner 
from the loss of rights and privileges incident to his citizenship in a particular 
place, such as, for example, paying resident tuition at a local university, 
invoking the jurisdiction of the local divorce courts, or voting in local 
elections.”175  
It is unlikely that an incarcerated individual would intend to remain 
in the community that incarcerated them and, without such a showing, it is 
unlikely that the individual has changed their domicile as defined by the 
federal courts and the Wisconsin Legislature. It seems unlikely that the 
Legislature would have chosen a word that has a key place in the state 
constitution, defined it consistently as it has been defined since the 1840s, 
and still intend for the constitutional version to mean something different. 
                                                           
171 WIS. STAT. § 51.40(2)(b)(1) (2019). 
172 WIS. STAT. § 6.10(1) (2019). 
173 See Denlinger v. Brennan, 87 F.3d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that domicile is a 
voluntary status and a forcible change of residence does not alter domicile); Stifel v. Hopkins, 
477 F.2d 1116, 1121 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that prisoners may acquire a domicile in their 
incarcerated community only by express showing of intent to remain); Ellingburg v. Connett, 
457 F.2d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that one does not change residence by virtue of 
incarceration and residence for venue purposes must be determined by facts); Cohen v. 
United States, 297 F.2d 760, 774 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating a prisoner’s pre-incarcerated 
residence is more appropriate than a temporary prison resident for giving of notice); United 
States v. Stabler, 169 F.2d 995, 998 (3d Cir. 1948) (holding that both residence and domicile 
require some individual choice and that domicile cannot be acquired while in prison); 
Neuberger v. United States, 13 F.2d 541, 543 (2nd Cir. 1926) (“. . . his residence, once 
established, was not lost by his enforced absence . . .”). 
174 African Americans in Wisconsin: Overview, supra note 160. 
175 Stifel, 477 F.2d at 1121. 
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B. Wisconsin Supreme Court Precedent 
 The Attorney General’s argument rests on two cases decided 
within months of each other in 1892, each devoting a single line for how 
“inhabitant” was intended to be used.176 Each case is primarily about 
gerrymandering and the concerns the court has for districts that are wildly 
disproportionate to others.177 
 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham is the first of the 
two cases dealing with gerrymandering cited by the Attorney General. In it, 
the attorney general at the time asked the court to invalidate the legislature’s 
recently passed redistricting plan which had apportioned some districts 
without regard to local government borders nor to the population in each 
district.178 The court rejected the reapportionment plan as 
unconstitutional.179 In relevant part:  
If, as in this case, there is such a wide and bold departure 
from this constitutional rule [of equal districts] that it 
cannot possibly be justified by the exercise of any judgment 
or discretion, and that evinces an intention on the part of 
the legislature to utterly ignore and disregard the rule of the 
constitution in order to promote some other object than a 
constitutional apportionment, then the conclusion is 
inevitable that the legislature did not use any judgment or 
discretion whatever.180  
This holding binds the legislature to adhere to constitutional rules 
of equalized total population in districts, but implicitly allows for the 
legislature to justify departures in the exercise of “judgment or discretion” 
which the Attorney General fails to acknowledge in his opinion.181 
 The second case, State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, was brought 
after the 1892 legislature had reconvened and passed a new redistricting 
plan that also had greatly uneven districts because the legislature did not 
split counties or other local units of government.182 Again, the court 
determined the plan to be unconstitutional and that apportionment 
“according to the number of inhabitants” requires an approximate 
equalization of people in each district.183 The holding in Lamb concerns a 
                                                           
176 State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35, 54 (Wis. 1892); State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. 
Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 738 (Wis. 1892) (Pinney, J., concurring). 
177 State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. at 59; State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham, 
51 N.W. at 738. 
178 State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. at 725. 
179 Id. at 730. 
180 Id. (emphasis added). 
181 Id. 
182 State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. at 35. 
183 Id. at 59. 
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very large disparity in total population between districts, and goes to 
ensuring that districts are roughly equal and follow both county and local 
government lines as practicably as possible.184 The Attorney General 
emphasizes that the apportionment is to be “‘according to the number of 
inhabitants’. . . and the enumeration is evidently intended as the basis of 
apportionment.”185  
However, the Attorney General does not distinguish between using 
the enumeration as the “basis of apportionment” or the “judgment or 
discretion” of the legislature as specified in the Attorney General 1981 
Opinion.186 Each case was decided by the same group of judges in the same 
year, with similar issues leading up to the eventual decision.187 It is unlikely 
that legislative discretion would be suitable for reasonable, minor deviations 
from total population equality among districts, and then change so quickly 
without being explicitly addressed. A more natural reading is that the 
districts must be practically equalized in population to avoid a situation like 
Baker v. Carr where populations among districts radically varied, while still 
allowing some discretion to the legislature to use their judgment.188 
 From these decisions, the Attorney General determined that total 
population, “according to the federal decennial census, must be used for 
legislative redistricting purposes.”189 This conclusion is unsupported when 
considered in light of other Wisconsin constitutional jurisprudence. 
C. Wisconsin’s Equal Protection Clause 
 Though Wisconsin’s Constitution does not contain the exact 
language from the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, the state has 
long considered an article of its own constitution as a “substantially 
equivalent limitation.”190 As the Fourteenth Amendment’s jurisprudence 
developed, Wisconsin courts formally tied their own jurisprudence for 
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution to the federal Fourteenth 
Amendment.191 
                                                           
184 Id.  
185 See Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 90 (emphasis in original). 
186 State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. at 738. 
187 See State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35; State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. 
Cunningham, 51 N.W. 274. 
188 See supra Section II.A for a discussion of Baker v. Carr. 
189 Attorney General 1981 Opinion, supra note 120, at 91. 
190 Kellogg v. Currens, 87 N.W. 561, 562 (1901) (stating that WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1 is a 
substantially similar limitation to the Fourteenth Amendment). 
191 See Reginald D. v. State, 533 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Wis. 1995) (“‘[T]here is no substantial 
difference’ between its equal protection and due process protections and that of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
27
Johnson: Wisconsin’s 3/5 Compromise: Prison Gerrymandering in Wisconsin Di
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
506 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
 Given the open question as to whether prison gerrymandering 
could constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, it seems likely 
that the Attorney General’s conclusion that Wisconsin’s Constitution 
requires something more is erroneous. This Note encourages Wisconsin to 
revisit the 1981 opinion. 
VI. EQUAL PROTECTIONS CLAUSE REQUIRES 
BLACK VOTES HAVE EQUAL IMPACT 
 The Supreme Court has made it clear that gerrymandering is 
constitutionally permissible unless it is specifically prohibited.192 More 
recently, the Court upheld districts drawn without consideration for the 
equalization of eligible voter population.193 Given the current state of the law 
post-Evenwel, it is likely that prison-based gerrymandering is facially 
permissible on a federal level. However, the Evenwel Court noted that in 
areas with large numbers of temporary residents, eligible voter population, 
instead of total population, may be the appropriate standard for 
constitutionally permissible districts.194  
Despite the unlikelihood of a facial challenge being successful, 
there may be some unusual situations where the facially-permissible prison 
gerrymandering results in an impermissible gerrymander, such as one based 
on race. Challenging the process as discriminatory may prove to be more 
successful in Wisconsin. The state’s demographic, geographic, and 
incarceration practices result in primarily Black individuals from primarily 
Black counties to be counted in primarily White counties far from their 
actual homes, but these individuals are neither allowed to vote in these 
counties nor meaningfully connect with them.  
The standards set forth in Calvin would serve as a good starting 
point for any potential legal challenge to a state’s prison gerrymandering 
process. Specifically, a state that could show their prisoners “comprise a (1) 
large number of (2) nonvoters who (3) lack a meaningful representational 
nexus with the[ir] [representatives], and . . . [are] (4) packed into a small 
subset of legislative districts.”195 Wisconsin’s profile may be a good 
opportunity to see whether the Seventh Circuit will follow Calvin or 
Davidson, or otherwise chart its own path. 
VII. WHAT’S NEXT? 
                                                           
192 Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966). 
193 Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016).   
194 Id. at 1124 (citing Burns, 384 U.S. at 73). 
195 Calvin v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1315 (N.D. Fla. 2016). 
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 Any change is likely to prove contentious. Despite consistent polls 
showing that seventy percent of Wisconsinites would prefer a less partisan 
process for redistricting,196 the Republican-controlled Legislature has 
rejected attempts to de-politicize the process.197 Wisconsin is currently under 
a divided government,198 and it seems likely that whatever redistricting plan 
is put into place will end up before the state’s Supreme Court once again.  
While it is likely inevitable that other partisan disputes will result in 
a lawsuit, the state can rectify a long history of miscounting its prison 
population by passing a reform such as the one recently passed in New 
Jersey.199 The data collection is not onerous. New Jersey law requires its 
Department of Corrections to keep a database of the last known residence 
for each person within their system that can then be used during redistricting 
to ensure an accurate count.200 Wisconsin’s Department of Corrections 
likely already keeps this information or, if it does not, could collect it going 
forward. In fact, a group of legislators introduced Assembly Bill 400 in the 
2020 session. It is simpler than New Jersey’s law in that it does not specify 
how the prisoner’s information is to be collected, granting the governor and 
legislature further discretion in developing those processes.201  
However, it is not easy to divorce prison gerrymandering from its 
typical partisan nature, so the likelihood of such a proposal passing a 
Republican-controlled Legislature is reduced. A study of prison 
gerrymandering in Pennsylvania “suggest[s] that incarceration, like the 
                                                           
196 Charles Franklin, New Marquette Law School Poll Finds Sanders’ Support Rising Among 
Democrats and Tight Races Between Trump and Each Democratic Candidate for President, 
MARQUETTE L. SCH. POLL (Feb. 27, 2020), https://law.marquette.edu/poll/2020/02/27/new-
marquette-law-school-poll-finds-sanders-support-rising-among-democrats-and-tight-races-
between-trump-and-each-democratic-candidate-for-president/ [https://perma.cc/J7TL-
QKGY] (“Voters favor a non-partisan approach to redistricting over the current process in 
which the legislature and governor are responsible for drawing legislative and congressional 
districts.”). 
197 Scott Bauer, Wisconsin Republicans Dismiss Nonpartisan Redistricting Plan, AP NEWS 
(Jan. 23, 2020), https://apnews.com/86670cf694caeffb440433abb2b8fed5 
[https://perma.cc/VDS9-3ULF] (“Democrats have tried in vain to have the Legislature 
change the redistricting process and create a nonpartisan commission. . . . Republicans have 
rejected past attempts to amend the constitution to create a nonpartisan redistricting 
process.”). 
198 Laurel White & Shawn Johnson, State Legislature Convenes New Session with Divided 
Government, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 7, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://www.wpr.org/state-
legislature-convenes-new-session-divided-government [https://perma.cc/72UY-8ZE3]. 
199 Brent Johnson & Matt Arco, N.J. Will Soon Allow You to Register to Vote Online, 
NJ.COM (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.nj.com/politics/2020/01/nj-will-soon-allow-you-to-
register-to-vote-online.html [https://perma.cc/C4RT-TKQN] (“The new law (S589) requires 
the Garden State’s secretary of state to create and maintain a secure website to allow eligible 
voters to register to vote using an online form.”). 
200 S. Doc. No. 758, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018). 
201 Assemb. B. 400, 2019–2020 Leg. (Wis. 2019). 
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urban/rural divide in voter preference, buttresses Republican advantages 
even without partisan gerrymandering. The results . . . indicate that 
incarceration leads to an overrepresentation of non-urban voters in 
democratic processes via rural vote inflation due to prison location.”202 
 In the absence of legislation, Wisconsin’s governor, as the head 
of the executive branch, could consider directing the Department of 
Corrections to collect information regarding prior residence. Once the data 
is collected, the governor could give it to the legislature to use as they see fit 
in the redistricting process. While this is not a true “solution” to prison 
gerrymandering, the information would put pressure on the legislature to 
incorporate the data in the redistricting process or pay a potential political 
price for actively ignoring the information. In the absence of legislation 
prohibiting the practice, public pressure and an awareness campaign would 
center the entire redistricting conversation around fair representation. 
 The governor could also ask the Department of Corrections, or a 
different state agency, to conduct a study of the impact banning prison 
gerrymandering might have on Wisconsin. Wisconsin deserves a 
comprehensive study to determine which districts’ power has been unfairly 
inflated by prison gerrymandering and which has been reduced. This is a 
critical first step to drafting fair districts going into the 2021 redistricting cycle 
and beyond. 
 Finally, the governor should ask the attorney general to revisit the 
Attorney General 1981 Opinion and reconsider it in light of forty years of 
additional case law and a growing prison population whose current 
residence does not meet the definition of inhabitance as used by the 
Wisconsin legislature. Such opinions may not bind courts to the Attorney 
General’s interpretation but can be persuasive nonetheless.203  
A governor-initiated proposal would also align neatly with 
Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers’ non-partisan People’s Maps 
Commission204 that would place public pressure on the legislature to adopt 
redistricting maps more fairly representative of Wisconsin.205  
                                                           
202 Remster & Kramer, supra note 9, at 22–23 (internal citation omitted). 
203 AG Opinions: What is an AG Opinion?, WIS. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/opinions/ag-opinions [https://perma.cc/Q6RA-5LYC] 
(“Wisconsin courts do not have any obligation to follow an interpretation provided by an 
[Opinion of the Attorney General], but they often do. As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
has written, ‘Well-reasoned attorney general’s opinions have persuasive value when a court 
later addresses the meaning of the same statute.’”). 
204 For more information on the People’s Maps Commission, see THE PEOPLE’S MAPS 
COMMISSION, https://govstatus.egov.com/peoplesmaps [https://perma.cc/FM75-FY7B]. 
205 Laurel White, Gov. Tony Evers Orders Creation of Nonpartisan Redistricting 
Commission, WIS. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 27, 2020, 11:05 AM), https://www.wpr.org/gov-tony-
evers-orders-creation-nonpartisan-redistricting-commission [https://perma.cc/VEJ7-6NZ5] 
(“‘When 80 percent of our state supports medical marijuana, and 80 percent of our state 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Prison gerrymandering is a policy issue with grave civil rights 
concerns. Unlike college students or members of the military, incarcerated 
individuals do not make use of local services, are ineligible to vote for their 
local representation, and are otherwise isolated from the community to 
which they only contribute a statistical body count.  
[I]ncarceration and American concepts of equal 
representation combine to create “phantom constituents” 
and racially unequal political representation. The 
incarcerated are not only missing from their communities, 
they are also advantaging other communities.206 
In an era of mass incarceration, the injustice perpetuated by prison 
gerrymandering will continue to compound. To paraphrase the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court decision relied upon by Attorney General La Follette, 
simply because previous redistricting plans have violated the constitution, 
the redistricting plan of 2021 may not do so with impunity.207 Wisconsin 
must act now to avoid continuing a century and a half of mistakes. 
                                                           
supports universal background checks, and also (extreme) risk protection orders, (and) 70 
percent want Medicaid expansion, and elected officials can ignore those numbers and say, 
“Go jump in a lake,” something’s wrong,’ Evers said.”). 
206 Remster & Kramer, supra note 9, at 26. 
207 State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35, 63 (Wis. 1892) (“I am not claiming that 
because previous legislatures have violated the constitution the legislature of 1892 may do so 
with impunity.”). 
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